A surprising contact on the professional network. An offer of employment from a recruiter, probably a young woman, operating from China. The chance to earn perhaps £20,000 on the side preparing a handful of geopolitical analyses for a firm from China containing confidential or “insider” insights. Payment in cryptocurrency or physical money preferred.
It may seem obvious, on this telling, that something about this approach would be suspicious. Nevertheless, China’s influential intelligence agency still considers it worthwhile to use recruitment consultants to attempt this – prompting MI5 to issue multiple warnings about their activity online.
Large-Scale Contact Attempts on Social Media
Last year, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum stated operatives from China were contacting Britons on LinkedIn on an extraordinary level, at a frequency of 10,000 over the preceding two and a half years, attempting to obtain governmental, industrial, defense and technological secrets. However a new initiative aimed at elected officials and parliament has prompted the spy agency to act again.
An espionage alert was distributed on this week via the offices of the Commons speaker and his House of Lords counterpart: a single slide after the repeated efforts of certain individuals and Amanda Qiu to reach out to MPs, lords, their assistants, economists, research organizations – anyone who might become a source.
Intelligence Approach and Legislative Updates
In the curious style of British intelligence, there was no publication of the protective guidance from MI5 or the Home Office. But the agency knew its briefing note would leak once it was sent electronically out to Westminster. Sharing it in the media helps the general population better identify communications with a fraudulent purpose.
The alert has the effect of uncovering additional details from in and around Westminster, although that is not the agency's main objective. The agency wants public figures to understand that just because exchanges on professional networks are not as toxic as on X or Facebook, it doesn't imply they are without risk.
Nor is internal security service understood to have been responding to a particular event in parliament, though the recent actions does come after the awkward failure of the prosecution of a ex-assistant Christopher Cash and his associate another person on a technicality earlier in the autumn.
Both individuals had been charged of spying for China – a allegation they denied – but inability to successfully conclude a trial under the now repealed previous legislation resulted in warnings that British democracy had been insufficiently defended.
Updated Laws and Beijing's Strategic Goals
The law has now been changed, and the security briefing includes a reminder of its replacement: “Those engaging in espionage activity risk substantial legal consequences under the National Security Act.” It is a crime if somebody participates in behavior that could potentially “significantly help a overseas spy agency”.
A natural inquiry, though, is what Beijing has to gain. An elected representative who is not a government minister will have limited knowledge of classified material, and an associate of theirs even less. Yet Beijing is particularly focused in the legislative body: for a time, in 2020 and 2021, the UK’s approach to China on issues such as Huawei or the Uyghur repression or alleged atrocities was being influenced by MPs.
Cultural Variations and Persistent Cyber Risks
In part there are cultural differences too. Authoritarian governments like Beijing's export intelligence collection methods and the size of its spy network is vast, employing 300,000 people. A former US official, a American cybersecurity head under president Joe Biden, said it was sometimes estimated that “China have more English speakers involved in this than we [western intelligence] have English speakers”.
Beijing is prepared to cultivate people over the long term and at times even the intelligence services have found it difficult to differentiate legitimate relationships and espionage. “Beijing has a low threshold for what information is deemed to be useful,” security minister a government official told parliamentarians on Wednesday, but a rapid shift in the government situation may result in an individual quickly marginal becomes important.
An alternative perspective to consider the relentless activities at secret intelligence collection is in the broader framework of the geopolitical contest between China and the west at a level below the point of direct conflict. The nation has increased its hacking efforts, with the Salt Typhoon penetration of communications systems in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon breach of countless connected equipment.
Beijing is involved in persistent attempts to identify covert sources on British democracy via digital means because it seeks to be challenging, to display influence and because it has the capability.
